Fog of Peace: Larval Warfare and the Ontogenesis of the Political // Nandita Biswas Mellamphy




This is an interview with Nandita Biswas Mellamphy. Nandita Biswas Mellamphy is a Professor of Political Science at Western University in London, Ontario, where she has taught since 2006, has served as Undergraduate Program Chair, and is currently Co-Director of the Centre for Transitional Justice and Post-Conflict Reconstruction. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Toronto (1997–2003), an M.A. from Western’s Centre for the Study of Theory and Criticism, and a B.A. in Political Studies from the University of Manitoba. Her research sits at the intersections of critical political theory, continental philosophy, media and information studies, and critical security studies, with particular attention to Nietzsche and post-Nietzschean thought, post-humanism, information and digital warfare, and surveillance and terrorism studies.

She is the author of The Three Stigmata of Friedrich Nietzsche: Political Physiology in the Age of Nihilism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) and co-editor, with Dan Mellamphy, of The Digital Dionysus: Nietzsche and the Network-Centric Condition (Punctum Books, 2016). She has held editorial roles including Assistant Editor of the Canadian Journal of Political Science and Associate Editor of Interconnections: Journal of Posthumanism, and is the founding Director of the interdisciplinary Electro-Governance Group, Affiliate Faculty in Gender, Sexuality, and Women’s Studies, and Core Faculty at the Centre for the Study of Theory and Criticism. Her recent work addresses AI, posthumanism, and warfare, including “Human, All Too Human? Anthropocene Narratives, Posthumanisms, and the Problem of Post-Anthropocentrism” (The Anthropocene Review, 2024, co-authored with Jacob Vangeest) and “Fuller Spectrum Operations: The Emergence of Larval Warfare” (Digital War, 2025).

Her current book project, The G.A.I. Science: Gen-AI Beyond the Human/Machine Divide, extends her long-standing critique of human-centred frameworks into the terrain of generative AI and post-human governance.






DIFFRACTIONS: From your early work on Foucault and “bodily inscription” to your current focus on information warfare, your scholarship pushes the boundaries of political materialism. What constitutes the primary “matter” of politics today: is it biological bodies, digital data, algorithmic code, or ecological forces, and what methodological approaches are required to analyze this expanded, hybrid terrain? How does this trajectory compel us to fundamentally rethink the very subject and object of political critique in an age where agency, power, and life itself are distributed across human and non-human networks?



Nandita Biswas Mellamphy: Whether I’m writing about Nietzsche, networks, the info-sphere, A.I., warfare, or larval post-humanism (my various zones of research), it strikes me that I seem to return again and again to the very same problem—that is: what happens when the concepts that we inherit stop fitting the world that they are supposed to describe? That concern was already there in my earliest works. What first drew me to the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche wasn’t simply his critique of morality and modernity but his refusal to separate ‘thought’ from ‘life’. Ideas don’t float above the world: thoughts, affects, habits, values, political institutions and actions are all inextricably—and moreover materially—entangled.

The idea of ‘political physiology’ resonated with me because it suggested that politics isn’t something we can understand solely by looking at governments, constitutions, ideologies, or formal institutions: politics is also about bodies, forces, dispositions, and ways of living. At the time, I was primarily thinking about human embodiment. Over the years, however, I became increasingly dissatisfied with approaches that assumed the human body was the sole or even primary material foundation of political life. So when people ask me what constitutes the primary ‘matter’ of politics today, I’m reluctant to choose among bodies, data, algorithms, infrastructures, ecological systems, or technological networks. The question itself assumes that politics has one underlying material substrate, and I’m no longer convinced that this is the most helpful way to think about it.


Drawing on Bernard Stiegler, I’ve increasingly come to think in terms of individuation, co-individuation, and transindividuation. What ‘matters’ politically are the processes through which things emerge, interact, and transform one another. Biological bodies obviously remain important, but so do digital and analogue data-bodies, infrastructures, code, energy systems, labour, autonomous agents, viruses, water, land, ideas, norms, and critical minerals. Politics takes shape through their entanglements rather than within any one domain alone. Once you start thinking this way, the terrain of political theory changes. States and institutions don’t disappear, but they no longer exhaust the field of analysis.

Political life increasingly unfolds through communication infrastructures, surveillance systems, computational environments, ecological systems, and technological architectures. The question shifts from ‘Who governs?’ to something more like: ‘Through what configurations and assemblages does governance occur?’ That shift also has methodological implications. If our objects of analysis are relational, then our methods can’t begin with fixed assumptions about where politics reside. I’ve increasingly found myself working across the fields of political theory, media and information studies, techno-science and information theory, critical security studies, and eco/environmental philosophy because the phenomena I explore don’t respect disciplinary boundaries. Methodologically, that means following relations rather than starting with predetermined categories of actors, institutions, scales, or domains; it means paying attention to connections, infrastructures, and processes of emergence rather than assuming that politics are contained within discrete political objects.



“To mediate without being mediated can here be equated with a capacity to bind without being bound, to elude capture while at the same time being able to set traps and go undetected” (Dan Mellamphy & Nandita Biswas Mellamphy, 2015: 15).



DIFF: Can you reflect on your edited work, The Digital Dionysus: Nietzsche and The Network-Centric Condition. If the Apollonian tendency represents the striated, computational, and individuated aspect of information, and the Dionysian represents the smooth, chaotic, and pre-individual background noise, what is “information” itself? Is it only the Apollonian signal, or is it the entire interfacial process between signal and noise?



NBM: One of the questions animating The Digital Dionysus—the text that is the marker of this transition in my work—was deceptively simple: namely, what exactly is ‘information’? Most discussions focus on what Nietzsche would have called the ‘Apollonian’ dimensions of information: we look at signals, order, structure, classification, and form. But I was intrigued by the possibility that this wasn’t the whole story; this particular publication asked what it might mean to privilege the ‘Dionysian’ background (background noise, if you will) of information rather than simply its signals and figures. I wasn’t trying to replace one with the other; rather, I wanted to draw attention to the fact that signal doesn’t emerge out of nowhere.

Form doesn’t simply ‘exist’; every stable informational pattern presupposes conditions that exceed it. That’s why I’ve never been entirely satisfied with definitions of information that focus only on recognizable content. Information isn’t just what appears at the surface—it’s also bound up with the processes through which forms emerge, stabilize, and change. In that sense, if I had to answer the question directly, I would say that information resides neither exclusively in signal nor exclusively in noise; it exists in the ongoing process through which the two become distinguishable from one another. What interests me is less the ‘thing’ called information than the ‘activity’ of formation itself (what Nietzsche calls ‘form-giving’).



DIFF: You note that “More and more scholarly attention is being paid to the challenges of governing artificial intelligence and emergent technologies. Most of the focus remains on questions of how to preserve the human-centeredness of increasingly advancing machine-driven technologies…” You also “problematize discourses of ‘human-centered AI’ that prioritize human control over nonhuman intelligences as a solution for the challenges posed by emergent technologies like artificial intelligence.” Can you elaborate?



NBM: In many ways, the questions raised by artificial intelligence strike me as extensions of those earlier concerns. A great deal of contemporary debate revolves around what has come to be called Human-Centred A.I. There are perfectly understandable reasons for that: people are worried about accountability, governance, responsibility, and control. Those concerns are important. At the same time, I’ve become increasingly interested in the assumptions that sit beneath these discussions. Human-centred frameworks often begin with a particular conception of the human (as the privileged site of reason, autonomy, legitimacy, and political authority). We talk about keeping humans ‘in the loop’, ‘on the loop’, or ‘out of the loop’, but we often spend less time asking why the loop has been organized around that particular understanding of the human in the first place.


For me, that’s where post-humanism becomes interesting. I don’t see post-humanism as an attack on humanity, nor do I see it as a celebration of machines; rather, in my opinion it would be better understood as a way of questioning assumptions that have become so familiar that we rarely notice them. Part of what concerns me is that many contemporary A.I. debates remain structured by logics that are inseparable from the history of colonialism. Colonial projects were justified through claims about superior forms of reason, knowledge, and political capacity—claims that legitimized the extraction of territory, labour, resources, and ways of life from those deemed less capable of governing themselves. Today’s A.I. systems emerge within similarly extractive infrastructures built on the capture of data, the exploitation of material resources, global supply chains, invisible forms of labour, and vast asymmetries of technical power.

For that reason, I don’t think the relationship between A.I. and colonialism is merely metaphorical: the intensification of data extraction, behavioural capture, computational resource accumulation, and algorithmic governance raises questions that are directly connected to longer histories of colonial extraction and administration. What concerns me is that human-centred A.I. can sometimes appear critical while still preserving the underlying assumption that political legitimacy ultimately rests with those who claim privileged access to intelligence, expertise, and control.


That concern eventually led me into questions of post-anthropocentrism. In debates about the Anthropocene, there is often a tendency either to reaffirm human centrality or to decentre the human altogether. What increasingly interests me is whether that opposition itself limits what we can think. Rather than deciding whether the human belongs at the centre or the margins, I’m interested in what becomes possible if we begin to question the terms of the distinction itself. At this point, people often raise what might be called the anthropocentric paradox: isn’t any attempt to move beyond the human still a human project? Doesn’t post-humanism simply reproduce the human as the being capable of imagining its own displacement? I don’t think speculative post-humanism escapes that paradox.

It begins from a human standpoint because it has to. What it can do, however, is render that standpoint visible as a historical and contingent position rather than treating it as universal. The goal isn’t to discover some impossible view from nowhere; it’s to become more attentive to the assumptions built into the categories we take for granted. Agency looks quite different from that perspective. Instead of treating agency as something possessed by isolated individuals, I find myself increasingly drawn to relational accounts. That doesn’t mean humans cease to matter; it means that agency begins to appear less as a property and more as something that emerges through relations among humans, technologies, institutions, infrastructures, and environments.



“Once one stops doing the incommensurate work of attempting to touch inhumanity, one loses traction and falls back onto the predictable coordinates of a relationality that announces itself as universal but is in fact only a substratum of the various potential interplays of life within which one is always inculcated” (Nandita Biswas Mellamphy, 2022). SOURCE.



This interest in networked and distributed agency also shaped my work on relational approaches to A.I. ethics. What attracts me to these approaches is that they don’t begin with fully formed, self-sufficient actors. They begin with relations and ask how political and ethical life emerges through them. I don’t think this leads to a new determinism of the alien or the technological; if anything, distributed agency multiplies the sites from which novelty, contingency, and transformation emerge. That’s partly what attracted me to ontogenetic approaches informed by Simondon. Ethics, from that perspective, isn’t simply the application of pre-existing rules to a situation: it emerges through processes of individuation occurring within a particular associated milieu. Ethics is not abandoned; rather, it’s understood as something relational and emergent rather than entirely fixed in advance.



DIFF: Could you shed light on your concept of larval warfare? How does larval warfare’s “latent and masked nature” fundamentally differ from existing concepts like “information warfare” or “political warfare”? Does its embeddedness within everyday digital life provide a qualitatively distinct analytical lens compared to frameworks that still conceptually separate a “cyber domain” from civilian life? Could you elaborate on your three constructs of warfare, i.e., Standard, Non-Standard, and larval warfare?



NBM: I developed the concept because I became increasingly dissatisfied with the vocabulary available for describing contemporary conflict. Distinctions between war and peace, civilian and combatant, battlefield and everyday life seemed to explain less and less of what I was theorizing. What strikes me about contemporary forms of conflict is their latency. Larval warfare doesn’t necessarily announce itself as warfare (never mind ‘war’). It operates through cognitive environments, informational ecosystems, communication networks, surveillance architectures, and the mundane aspects of everyday life that don’t typically register as military or militarized spaces.

That’s why I distinguish among ‘standard’, ‘non-standard’, and ‘larval’ warfare. ‘Standard’ warfare generally presumes recognizable military confrontation; ‘non-standard’ warfare disrupts many of those assumptions through irregular and asymmetric forms of conflict; and ‘larval’ warfare points toward something else altogether—conflict migrates into the informational and communicative environments through which everyday life is organized. For that reason, I don’t think larval warfare can simply be equated with information warfare. Information warfare still implies a comparatively identifiable theatre of informational conflict. Larval warfare points toward the erosion and reformulation—mutation, transformation—of that distinction itself. What becomes significant is not merely information as an instrument of conflict but the extent to which conflict and polarization become embedded within the environments through which everyday social life takes place.



DIFF: You argue that the category of the civilian becomes a “fuzzy set.” Does larval warfare, by weaponizing the infrastructure of daily life, effectively eliminate the non-combatant as a meaningful legal or ethical category? What replaces it: the perpetual “civilian soldier,” the profiled data subject, or something else?



NBM: Once that happens, categories become less stable. I’m not suggesting that the civilian disappears—the civilian remains an indispensable legal and ethical category, but contemporary conditions complicate how we understand it. Rather than disappearing, the civilian increasingly appears as a hybrid figure: citizen, consumer, user, data-subject, target, and node within informational environments all at once. Similar ambiguities emerge around the distinctions between governance and security, communication and influence, war and peace.

Those ambiguities eventually led me to think through the idea of a ‘fog of war’ (in the Clausewitzian sense) and a ‘fog of peace’ (in a contemporary sense). Increasingly, I am becoming more and more interested in situations where the uncertainty is not simply happening within conflicts, but also in contexts in which there is no apparent conflict at all but damage is nonetheless being done and experienced. Are we dealing with governance? communication? surveillance? security? influence operations? some emerging combination of all of these? Larval warfare becomes interesting precisely because it inhabits that ambiguity.



“To capture its prey the predator must also try to think like its prey by masking its predatory nature, becoming in some perverse but useful sense like its prey, and performing the asymmetric sleight of hand in which the strong becomes like the weak and the weak becomes like the strong” (Biswas-Mellamphy, 2025).



It’s also significant because it draws attention to the role of non-human entities and increasingly autonomous systems of information capture and surveillance. I don’t see this as evidence that humans are becoming ‘irrelevant’; rather, it forces us to think more carefully about where agency, responsibility, and power are actually located within contemporary political systems. One of the more unsettling implications of larval warfare is that humans increasingly appear simultaneously as operators, targets, resources, and environments of informational systems. We remain in the loop, but we’re often no longer outside the systems we seek to govern. In some respects, we become both participants in and objects of informational processes that exceed any individual actor.



DIFF: As you look ahead, where do you feel your thought pulling you now? What new territories or concepts are currently incubating?



NBM: If there’s one place where I feel my thinking is being pulled right now (and, I suppose, from the get-go), it’s toward questions of relation, emergence, and ontogenesis. For quite a while I’ve been interested in critiques of human exceptionalism and distributed agency, but lately I’ve become less interested in simply criticizing anthropocentrism than in asking what might replace it. It’s one thing to point out the limits of human-centred frameworks; it’s another to think through what political, ethical, and epistemic life might actually look like beyond them.


That’s one reason I’ve found myself returning repeatedly to Simondon. The recent work I’ve been doing on relational A.I. ethics grows out of that interest. What I’ve been trying to understand is whether debates about A.I. ethics have become trapped within a relatively narrow set of assumptions. Much of the discussion assumes that ethics already exists in a finished form and that the task is simply to apply it to increasingly sophisticated technologies. What interests me is the possibility that ethics itself might have to be thought differently. The framework I’ve been exploring contrasts familiar human-centred approaches with more relational and ontogenetic approaches.

What ultimately fascinates me is the possibility that ethics doesn’t precede relations but emerges through them. What if ethical life is not simply something we bring to technological systems? What if it develops through the relations formed within particular milieus? That question feels increasingly important because so many discussions of A.I. remain organized around control, oversight, and mastery. Those concerns matter, but they often leave untouched a deeper question: how do relation and relationality transform the conditions under which agency, responsibility, and ethical life emerge in the first place? The ontogenetic model appeals to me because it redirects attention toward processes of becoming. It encourages us to ask not simply what AI is but what new forms of relation become possible through human-A.I. interactions. That doesn’t mean embracing technological utopianism or determinism. It means acknowledging that the conceptual resources we’ve inherited may not be adequate or sufficient.


At the same time, I’ve become increasingly preoccupied with what might broadly be called apocalyptic narratives. I don’t mean apocalypse in a narrowly theological sense—I’m thinking instead about the extent to which contemporary political thought seems haunted by ‘endings’: ecological collapse, democratic decline, civilizational crisis, planetary instability, informational warfare, artificial intelligence as existential risk. We’re surrounded by stories about the end of one world or another. What might this reveal about the limits of our existing categories? Again and again, moments of crisis expose conceptual problems that were already there.

Distinctions between nature and technology, human and machine, war and peace, subject and object begin to break down. We often experience that instability as catastrophe, but instability is also productive: many of my recent projects have been attempts to understand what becomes visible during those moments when familiar coordinates stop working. Crisis doesn’t merely destroy existing frameworks; it also reveals assumptions we didn’t realize we were making. Those concerns connect directly to my work on post-human governance. Increasingly, I’m interested in how informational systems, forms of algorithmic coordination, predictive infrastructures, and A.I.-driven environments are reshaping political authority. The question isn’t whether machines replace humans—that formulation increasingly strikes me as too simple. The more interesting question is how agency, responsibility, authority, and judgment become redistributed within increasingly automated environments. What kinds of political subjects emerge under those conditions? What kinds of institutions become possible? What becomes of democratic life when decisions are increasingly shaped by informational processes operating at scales and speeds difficult for humans to perceive?



“Mètis always involves a métissage, a [ghost-in-the-]shell-game involving pretense, the mixing and mixing-up of appearances and consistencies, corporeal quantities and qualities in order to be able to do something that gains advantage” (Biswas, Mellamphy, n.d.). SOURCE.



Those questions sit at the centre of my current book project, The G.A.I. Science: Gen-AI Beyond the Human/Machine Divide. In many ways, this project feels like the convergence point for a number of concerns that have been developing across my work for years. What attracts me to generative AI isn’t simply the technology itself. Nor am I especially interested in repeating familiar stories about whether AI will save humanity or destroy it. Those narratives often remain trapped within the same binaries they claim to question.

What increasingly interests me is the human/machine divide itself. Why do we continue to treat ‘the human’ and ‘the machine’ as self-evident categories? What assumptions are built into that distinction? What does it allow us to see? What does it prevent us from seeing? One thing that keeps returning in this work is that contemporary AI debates often oscillate between domination and displacement. Either humans control machines or machines replace humans. Yet both narratives share a common assumption: that the relation between them is fundamentally antagonistic. I’m no longer convinced that this is the most productive place to begin. What if the more interesting question concerns coexistence rather than domination? What if intelligence is neither exclusively human nor exclusively machinic? What if generative AI is forcing us to rethink categories that have structured modern political thought for centuries?


I don’t yet have definitive answers to those questions. But then again, I’ve always been (and continue to be!) suspicious of definitive answers. What continues to attract me are moments of conceptual transition, moments when categories loosen, assumptions become visible, and previously stable distinctions begin to teeter. That’s usually where the most interesting political and philosophical questions emerge. And if I look at the trajectory of my work as a whole, that’s probably the thread that ties it all together. Whether I’m writing about Nietzsche, information, post-humanism, AI, or warfare, I keep returning to the same basic problem: political theory inherits distinctions that seem perfectly natural—human and nonhuman, subject and object, war and peace, civilian and combatant, intelligence and instrument—yet many of the transformations that we are now living through place those distinctions under enormous pressure.

I’m not convinced that the task is simply to abandon them; nor do I think the answer is to cling to them unchanged. What interests me is that moment when a concept starts to lose its grip, when it no longer fully captures the phenomenon it is meant to describe. That’s usually where my work begins. I’m interested in what those moments reveal about the world we’re inhabiting and what new ways of thinking they might make possible. In many ways, that’s what I’ve been trying to do all along.






REFERENCES

 


Books:



Biswas Mellamphy, N. (2011). The Three Stigmata of Friedrich Nietzsche: Political Physiology in the Age of Nihilism. Palgrave Macmillan.


Mellamphy, D., & Biswas Mellamphy, N. (Eds.). (2016). The Digital Dionysus: Nietzsche and the Network-Centric Condition. punctum books.



Journal Articles:



Biswas Mellamphy, N. (2021). Humans “in the Loop”?: Human-Centrism, Posthumanism, and AI. Nature and Culture, 16(1), 11–27.


Biswas Mellamphy, N. (2025). Fuller spectrum operations: The emergence of larval warfare. Digital War, 6(1), Article 5. https://doi.org/10.1057/s42984-024-00099-8


Biswas Mellamphy, N., & Vangeest, J. (2024). Human, all too human? Anthropocene narratives, posthumanisms, and the problem of “post-anthropocentrism.” The Anthropocene Review. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1177/20530196241236215


Mellamphy, D., & Biswas Mellamphy, N. (2005). In “descent” proposal: Pathologies of embodiment in Nietzsche, Kafka, and Foucault. Foucault Studies, 3, 27–48.



Editorial Work:



Biswas Mellamphy, N., Dyer-Witheford, N., Hearn, A., & Matviyenko, S. (Eds.). (2015). Apps and affect [Special issue]. The Fibreculture Journal, (25).